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Darren Mangado, 
visi ng fellow at the  
East‐West Center in 
Washington explains 
that “For some, these 
ac vi es come off as an 
imposi on of the U.S. 
agenda, with terrorism 
and transna onal 
crimes viewed as 
excuses for a more U.S. 
interven onist stance in 
the region.” 
Southeast Asia taps the private sector to help finance its more than $3 trillion infrastructure deficit by promo ng 
public‐private partnerships (P3). To facilitate transparent and profitable P3 par cipa on by the private sector, 
most Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have established P3 ins tu ons and 
ra fied legal reforms. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia’s ini a ves have not been complemented by reciprocal 
ini a ves and reforms by its major economic partners such as the United States to encourage mul na onal 
corpora on (MNC) par cipa on in P3. Unlike Japanese MNCs, U.S. MNCs do not receive support from their 
government in Southeast Asian infrastructure development engagement, and discouraged by its stringent 
enforcement of extraterritorial domes c laws such as the Foreign Corrupt Prac ces Act (FCPA). Thus, U.S. MNCs 
opt to invest in the ‘safer’ Southeast Asian services sector. This arrangement, however, can be self‐defea ng in 
the long run. Southeast Asian local businesses are thriving and effec vely compe ng against their foreign 
counterparts in the services sector; and most Southeast Asian governments are increasingly becoming protec ve 
of their local services sectors. Meanwhile, U.S. limita ons adversely create a capital vacuum in Southeast Asian 
infrastructure development projects that, in turn, jus fies Southeast Asian reliance on other partners such as 
China to address infrastructure deficits.  
The United States heavily relies on foreign aid and bilateral trade deals in its engagements with Southeast Asia. 
The amount of U.S. foreign aid has dras cally decreased from $1.08 billion total disbursement in 2016 to 
$323.51 million in 2018. This amount cannot compete with economic assistance offered by China. Moreover, 
U.S. foreign aid is directed at ac vi es which promote ins tu onal reforms for market liberaliza on, transparent 
and democra c governance, and an ‐terrorism and an ‐transna onal crimes programs. While important, these 
ac vi es are not in line with Southeast Asia’s development priori es. For some, these ac vi es come off as an 
imposi on of the U.S. agenda, with terrorism and transna onal crimes viewed as excuses for a more U.S. 
interven onist stance in the region. Meanwhile, the current U.S. preference for bilateral trade deals to address 
trade deficits and promote policy reforms in its partners can only achieve meager goals; U.S. developing partners 
cannot afford reciprocal and immediate market liberaliza on. Southeast Asia, for example, prefers gradual 
reforms at pace with its development agenda. These strategies inhibit the United States from responding 
adequately to Southeast Asian economic priori es, and fail to consider the demands other than market access of 
its own MNCs in their Southeast Asian opera ons. 
The United States may improve its economic strategy in Southeast Asia by observing Japan and coordina ng with 
exis ng Japanese ins tu ons opera ng in the region. Japan’s economic strategy includes support for the 
Southeast Asian private sector. Japan sponsors economic ins tu ons such as Japan Bank for Interna onal 
Coopera on (JBIC), which offers financial assistance not just to over 12,000 Japanese business en es opera ng 
in Southeast Asia, but also to Southeast Asian financial ins tu ons, governments, and business en es in joint 
ventures with Japanese MNCs. Southeast Asia and the private sector benefited from JBIC with approximately $45 
billion loan commitments (from 1999 to 2016). These loans helped develop and diversify Southeast Asian 
businesses; and deeply integrated Japanese produc on networks to Southeast Asian local economies. Moreover, 
JBIC’s priority sectors, which include infrastructure development, complement Southeast Asian development 
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agendas and allow Japan to respond well to Southeast Asian priori es. Japan by itself, however, cannot 
address the en re Southeast Asian infrastructure deficit. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment 
Corpora on (OPIC) and its reforms (outlined in the BUILD Act) can benefit from JBIC’s example. Japan and 
the United States should foster and coordinate JBIC‐OPIC partnership mechanisms to mi gate 
compe on and expand opportuni es for their respec ve MNCs and Southeast Asian partners in the 
region. 
The stringent U.S. enforcement of the FCPA also discourages its own MNC opera ons abroad. The FCPA 
mandates the U.S. government to prosecute U.S. MNCs and their affiliates, foreign companies publicly 
listed in the United States, and individuals found guilty of suppor ng corrupt prac ces abroad. It 
discourages U.S. MNCs to expand their opera ons in poten ally profitable but ‘corrupt’ developing 
countries. The U.S. DOJ and SEC recorded a total of 58 enforcement opera ons in 2016 (the highest 
recorded cases from 1977 to 2018). Companies can be charged with a se lement fee of up to $1.7 billion. 
The annual ASEAN Business Outlook Survey consistently lists corrup on as a primary concern for U.S. 
MNCs in Southeast Asia. The defini on of corrup on, however, is problema c. The FCPA only proscribes 
bribery and off‐the books accoun ng, but in popular debates corrup on is misconstrued to include 
intrusion by the state into the market. This conflicts with how corrup on is viewed by much of the 
developing world, which notes corrup on as the priva za on of the public sector. For most developing 
countries, the solu on to corrup on is not an open market, which grants free reign to the private sector, 
but the establishment of a strong public sector that can exercise effec ve control even in the market. This 
disconnect is partly responsible for the U.S. percep on of Southeast Asia as a region beleaguered by 
corrup on. The FCPA and the general outlook discourage infrastructure investments in the region by U.S. 
MNCs. In some cases, the United States invokes corrup on to avoid economic engagements with its 
prospec ve partners altogether, thus contribu ng to the capital vacuum, which other actors are happy to 
fill. 
The United States can look at Japan’s experience in Southeast Asia as an example of an effec ve economic 
strategy in the region. Japan priori zes stability in its economic rela ons with Southeast Asia and 
relegates poli cal issues including corrup on as domes c issues that can be resolved by na onal 
governments. Japan supports ins tu onal reforms ini ated by Southeast Asian governments instead of 
fois ng reforms upon them. Japan’s tolerant a tude toward Southeast Asian poli cal affairs has proven 
beneficial to regional economy and stability. Instead of disengaging with certain poli cally vola le 
Southeast Asian countries, Japan maintains economic rela ons with them through its MNCs. For example, 
in the 1990s, Japan allowed its MNCs to support the development of Vietnam’s automobile industry even 
though it publicly honored the US‐led economic sanc ons against Vietnam. Japan and Japanese MNCs 
arguably served as catalyst for these countries to reintegrate their economies with the rest of the region 
and the world.  
Southeast Asia is now calling for MNCs to share the burden in infrastructure development and not just to 
operate business as usual. The United States and Japan would do well to respond to this invita on by 
encouraging and suppor ng their MNCs to invest so as to avoid a capital vacuum that could jus fy 
Southeast Asia in veering away from the United States and Japan. 
"For most developing 
countries, the solu on to 
corrup on is not an open 
market, which grants free 
reign to the private sector, 
but the establishment of a 
strong public sector that 
can exercise effec ve 
control even in the 
market. This disconnect is 
partly responsible for the 
U.S. percep on of 
Southeast Asia as a region 
beleaguered by 
corrup on." 
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